Mozilla and Opera remove Avast extensions from their add-on stores, what will Google do?

A month ago I wrote about Avast browser extensions being essentially spyware. While this article only names Avast Online Security and AVG Online Security extensions, the browser extensions Avast SafePrice and AVG SafePrice show the same behavior: they upload detailed browsing profiles of their users to uib.ff.avast.com. The amount of data collected here exceeds by far what would be considered necessary or appropriate even for the security extensions, for the shopping helpers this functionality isn’t justifiable at all.

Avast watching you while browsing the web

After I published my article I got the hint to look at Jumpshot, a company acquired by Avast in 2013. And indeed, that suddenly made perfect sense. On their website, Jumpshot praises its “clickstream data” product:

Rendering McAfee web protection ineffective

Now that I’m done with Kaspersky, it’s time to look at some other antivirus software. Our guest today is McAfee Total Protection 16.0. Let’s say this up front: it’s nowhere near the mess we’ve seen with Kaspersky. It doesn’t break up your encrypted connections, and the web protection component is limited to the McAfee WebAdvisor browser extension. So the attack surface is quite manageable here. The extension also uses native messaging to communicate with the application, so we won’t see websites taking over this communication channel.

Of course, browser extensions claiming to protect you from online threats have some rather big shoes to fill. They have to be better than the browser’s built-in malware and phishing protection, not an easy task. In fact, McAfee WebAdvisor “blocks” malicious websites after they already started loading, this being not quite optimal but rather typical for this kind of extension. I also found three issues in the way McAfee WebAdvisor 6.0 was implemented which made its protection far less reliable than it should be.

Rusty WebAdvisor shield

More Kaspersky vulnerabilities: uninstalling extensions, user tracking, predictable links

I’m discuss three more vulnerabilities in Kaspersky software such as Kaspersky Internet Security 2019 here, all exploitable by arbitrary websites. These allowed websites to uninstall browser extensions, track users across Private Browsing session or even different browsers and control some functionality of Kaspersky software. As of Patch F for 2020 products family and Patch I for 2019 products family all of these issues should be resolved.

Kaspersky functionality shattered

Note: This is the high-level overview. If you want all the technical details you can find them here. There are also older articles on Kaspersky vulnerabilities: Internal Kaspersky API exposed to websites and Kaspersky in the Middle - what could possibly go wrong?

Assorted Kaspersky vulnerabilities

This will hopefully be my last article on vulnerabilities in Kaspersky products for a while. With one article on vulnerabilities introduced by interception of HTTPS connections and another on exposing internal APIs to web pages, what’s left in my queue are three vulnerabilities without any relation to each other.

Kaspersky functionality shattered

Note: Lots of technical details ahead. If you only want a high-level summary, there is one here.

Internal Kaspersky API exposed to websites

In December 2018 I discovered a series of vulnerabilities in Kaspersky software such as Kaspersky Internet Security 2019. Due to the way its Web Protection feature is implemented, internal application functionality can used by any website. It doesn’t matter whether you allowed Kaspersky Protection browser extension to be installed, Web Protection functionality is active regardless and exploitable.

Kaspersky's communication with the browser protected by an easy to find key

Note: This is the high-level overview. If you want all the technical details you can find them here.

Kaspersky: The art of keeping your keys under the door mat

Kaspersky’s web protection feature will block ads and trackers, warn you about malicious search results and much more. The complication here: this functionality runs in the browser and needs to communicate with the main application. For this communication to be secure, an important question had to be answered: under which doormat does one put the keys to the kingdom?

Kaspersky's communication with the browser protected by an easy to find key

Note: Lots of technical details ahead. If you only want a high-level summary, there is one here.

This post sums up five vulnerabilities that I reported to Kaspersky. It is already more than enough ground to cover, so I had to leave unrelated vulnerabilities out. But don’t despair, there is a separate blog post discussing those.

Avast Online Security and Avast Secure Browser are spying on you

Are you one of the allegedly 400 million users of Avast antivirus products? Then I have bad news for you: you are likely being spied upon. The culprit is the Avast Online Security extension that these products urge you to install in your browser for maximum protection.

But even if you didn’t install Avast Online Security yourself, it doesn’t mean that you aren’t affected. This isn’t obvious but Avast Secure Browser has Avast Online Security installed by default. It is hidden from the extension listing and cannot be uninstalled by regular means, its functionality apparently considered an integral part of the browser. Avast products promote this browser heavily, and it will also be used automatically in “Banking Mode.” Given that Avast bought AVG a few years ago, there is also a mostly identical AVG Secure Browser with the built-in AVG Online Security extension.

Avast watching you while browsing the web

PfP: Pain-free Passwords security review

This is a guest post by Jane Doe, a security professional who was asked to do a security review of PfP: Pain-free Passwords. While publishing the results under her real name would have been preferable, Jane has good reasons to avoid producing content under her own name.

I reviewed the code of the Pain-free Passwords extension. It’s a stateless password manager that generates new passwords based on your master password, meaning that you don’t have to back your password database up (although, you also can import your old passwords, which do need backing up). For this kind of password managers, the most sensitive part is the password generation algorithm. Other possibly vulnerable components include those common for all password managers: autofill, storage and cloud sync.

Password list in PfP: Pain-free Passwords

State of the art protection in Chrome Web Store

All of you certainly know already that Google is guarding its Chrome Web Store vigilantly and making sure that no bad apples get in. So when you hit “Report abuse” your report will certainly be read carefully by another human being and acted upon ASAP. Well, eventually… maybe… when it hits the news. If it doesn’t, then it probably wasn’t important anyway and these extensions might stay up despite being taken down by Mozilla three months ago.

Canons protecting an old fort
Image by Sheba_Also

As to your legitimate extensions, these will be occasionally taken down as collateral damage in this fierce fight. Like my extension which was taken down due to missing a screenshot because of not having any user interface whatsoever. It’s not possible to give an advance warning either, like asking the developer to upload a screenshot within a week. This kind of lax policies would only encourage the bad guys to upload more malicious extensions without screenshots of course.

Kaspersky in the Middle - what could possibly go wrong?

Roughly a decade ago I read an article that asked antivirus vendors to stop intercepting encrypted HTTPS connections, this practice actively hurting security and privacy. As you can certainly imagine, antivirus vendors agreed with the sensible argument and today no reasonable antivirus product would even consider intercepting HTTPS traffic. Just kidding… Of course they kept going, and so two years ago a study was published detailing the security issues introduced by interception of HTTPS connections. Google and Mozilla once again urged antivirus vendors to stop. Surely this time it worked?

Of course not. So when I decided to look into Kaspersky Internet Security in December last year, I found it breaking up HTTPS connections so that it would get between the server and your browser in order to “protect” you. Expecting some deeply technical details about HTTPS protocol misimplementations now? Don’t worry, I don’t know enough myself to inspect Kaspersky software on this level. The vulnerabilities I found were far more mundane.

Kaspersky Internet Security getting between browser and server

I reported eight vulnerabilities to Kaspersky Lab between 2018-12-13 and 2018-12-21. This article will only describe three vulnerabilities which have been fixed in April this year. This includes two vulnerabilities that weren’t deemed a security risk by Kaspersky, it’s up to you to decide whether you agree with this assessment. The remaining five vulnerabilities have only been fixed in July, and I agreed to wait until November with the disclosure to give users enough time to upgrade.

Edit (2019-08-22): In order to disable this functionality you have to go into Settings, select “Additional” on the left side, then click “Network.” There you will see a section called “Encryption connection scanning” where you need to choose “Do not scan encrypted connections.”